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Building Populist Discourse: An Analysis of Populist Communication in American Presidential Elections, 1896–2016

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  • James J. Fahey

Abstract

Objectives This article examined the history of the use of populist frames in American presidential campaign discourse in order to answer a set of interrelated questions about how populist discourse is constructed and employed. Methods Using a novel database of presidential campaign speeches (n = 189) from 63 major candidates from 1896 to 2016, I coded these speeches for presence or absence of a set of 11 populist frames. Mokken scale analysis was conducted to determine if populist discourse is “built” in a logical way by political candidates. Regression analysis was conducted to measure if outsider candidates were more likely to employ populist framing. Results Eight of the 11 frames comprise a stable Mokken scale that measures populist discourse. Results show that anti‐bureaucratic and nativist frames do not load onto the same factor as other populist frames, suggesting that they may be measuring a separate concept. Candidates are more likely to use generic, less threatening aspects of the populist frame than they are to use illiberal, “risky” frames. Less experienced and third‐party candidates are also more likely to use populist discourse. Conclusion Populism is a flexible but coherent set of discursive frames present across modern campaign history. Populist framings are most commonly utilized by outsider candidates.

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  • James J. Fahey, 2021. "Building Populist Discourse: An Analysis of Populist Communication in American Presidential Elections, 1896–2016," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1268-1288, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:102:y:2021:i:4:p:1268-1288
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12951
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    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    2. Smith, Rogers M., 1993. "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 549-566, September.
    3. Michael Freeden, 1998. "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 46(4), pages 748-765, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eline A. de Rooij & Dominik A. Stecuła & Mark A. Pickup, 2022. "Populist media diets," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 103(4), pages 975-991, July.
    2. Bart Bonikowski & Yuchen Luo & Oscar Stuhler, 2022. "Politics as Usual? Measuring Populism, Nationalism, and Authoritarianism in U.S. Presidential Campaigns (1952–2020) with Neural Language Models," Sociological Methods & Research, , vol. 51(4), pages 1721-1787, November.

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