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Polarization and the Decline of Economic Voting in American National Elections

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  • Christopher R. Ellis
  • Joseph Daniel Ura

Abstract

Objective There is substantial evidence that American voters blame or credit the president for the state of the economy when making electoral decisions. However, a variety of findings on economic voting, cognitive biases in information processing, and party polarization indicate that both objective and subjective economic information should become less important to voters as partisan polarization increases. We evaluate whether partisan polarization attenuates the link between economic performance and citizens’ votes. Methods We estimate statistical models of the incumbent party vote shares in U.S. presidential elections from 1952 to 2016 including as predictive terms national partisan polarization (DW‐NOMINATE) and the interaction between polarization and economic growth (annualized second quarter GDP change in election years). Results We find support for our expectation that greater partisan polarization mitigates the association between economic performance and American election returns. Conclusion Economic performance exerts less influence on vote choices when parties are highly polarized than when they are not. Also, currently high levels of partisan polarization in the United States indicate elections will remain competitive, even if economic conditions otherwise favor or undermine an incumbent candidate's chances of winning.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher R. Ellis & Joseph Daniel Ura, 2021. "Polarization and the Decline of Economic Voting in American National Elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(1), pages 83-89, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:102:y:2021:i:1:p:83-89
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12881
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brambor, Thomas & Clark, William Roberts & Golder, Matt, 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-82, January.
    2. Duch,Raymond M. & Stevenson,Randolph T., 2008. "The Economic Vote," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521881029, September.
    3. Corwin D. Smidt, 2017. "Polarization and the Decline of the American Floating Voter," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 365-381, April.
    4. Duch,Raymond M. & Stevenson,Randolph T., 2008. "The Economic Vote," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521707404, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hazama,Yasushi, 2023. "Welfare, Corruption, and the Economic Vote of Punishment: The Turkish Case," IDE Discussion Papers 908, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    2. Danielle Joesten Martin, 2022. "Ideological and partisan biases in ratings of candidate quality in U.S. House elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 103(3), pages 622-634, May.

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