Adam Smith's “tolerable administration of justice” and the Wealth of Nations
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12229
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Timothy Besley & Thiemo Fetzer & Hannes Mueller, 2015.
"The Welfare Cost Of Lawlessness: Evidence From Somali Piracy,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 203-239, April.
- Besley, Timothy & Fetzer, Thiemo & Mueller, Hannes, 2015. "The welfare cost of lawlessness: evidence from Somali piracy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66041, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008.
"The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," NBER Working Papers 13608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & La Porta, Rafael & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Scholarly Articles 2962610, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Timothy Besley & Hannes Mueller, 2018.
"Predation, Protection, and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 184-221, April.
- Timothy Besley & Hannes Mueller, 2016. "Predation, Protection and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective," Working Papers 900, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Besley, Timothy & Mueller, Hannes, 2018. "Predation, protection, and productivity: a firm-level perspective," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84144, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Avinash Dixit, 2009. "Governance Institutions and Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 5-24, March.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009.
"The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
- Persson, Torsten & Besley, Tim, 2007. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 6370, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten, 2009. "The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 33768, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2007. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," NBER Working Papers 13028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001.
"The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Murrell, Peter, 2017.
"Design and evolution in institutional development: The insignificance of the English Bill of Rights,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 36-55.
- Peter Murrell, 2009. "Design and Evolution in Institutional Development: The Insignificance of the English Bill of Rights," Electronic Working Papers 09-001, University of Maryland, Department of Economics.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Judicial Checks and Balances,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Judicial Checks and Balances," NBER Working Papers 9775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Pop-Eleches, Cristian & Shleifer, Andrei, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Scholarly Articles 3451311, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2004.
"Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,"
Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-165, June.
- Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 9305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rodrik, Dani & Subramanian, Arvind & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 3643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CID Working Papers 97, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
"Legal Origins,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1193-1229.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Legal Origins," NBER Working Papers 8272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Shleifer, Andrei, 2002. "Legal Origins," Scholarly Articles 29408124, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Legal Origins," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1920, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Philippe Aghion, 2005. "Growth and Institutions," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 3-18, March.
- Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010.
"Property Rights and Economic Development,"
Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595,
Elsevier.
- Besley, Tim & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property Rights and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2009. "Property Rights and EconomicDevelopment," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 006, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property rights and economic development," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25428, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Ryan Bubb, 2013. "The Evolution of Property Rights: State Law or Informal Norms?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 555-594.
- De Long, J Bradford & Shleifer, Andrei, 1993.
"Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 671-702, October.
- De Long, J. Bradford & Shleifer, Andrei, 1993. "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," Scholarly Articles 3451302, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer, 1993. "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," NBER Working Papers 4274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Salter, John, 1994. "Adam Smith on Justice and Distribution in Commercial Societies," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(3), pages 299-313, August.
- Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg, 2013. "Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between property rights and judicial independence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 66-73.
- Scully, Gerald W, 1988. "The Institutional Framework and Economic Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 652-662, June.
- Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), 2010. "Handbook of Development Economics," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 5, number 6.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005.
"Unbundling Institutions,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2003. "Unbundling Institutions," NBER Working Papers 9934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2011. "Land Property Rights and Resource Allocation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 329-345.
- Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, 2011. "Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 537-572.
- Nathan Rosenberg, 1960. "Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(6), pages 557-557.
- Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
- Jan U. Auerbach & Costas Azariadis, 2015. "Property Rights, Governance, and Economic Development," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 210-220, May.
- North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
- Claudia Williamson, 2009. "Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 371-387, June.
- Rasmussen, Dennis C., 2016. "Adam Smith on What Is Wrong with Economic Inequality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(2), pages 342-352, May.
- Mahoney, Paul G, 2001. "The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 503-525, Part I Ju.
- Julio Ríos-Figueroa & Jeffrey K. Staton, 2014. "An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures of Judicial Independence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 104-137.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Douglas A. Irwin, 2014. "Adam Smith's "Tolerable Administration of Justice" and the Wealth of Nations," NBER Working Papers 20636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rok Spruk & Mitja Kovac, 2018. "Inefficient Growth," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 9(2).
- Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010.
"Property Rights and Economic Development,"
Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595,
Elsevier.
- Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2009. "Property Rights and EconomicDevelopment," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 006, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Besley, Tim & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property Rights and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property rights and economic development," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25428, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Menyashev, Rinat & Natkhov, Timur & Polishchuk, Leonid & Syunyaev, Georgiy, 2011. "New Institutional Economics: A state-of-the-art review for economic sociologists," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 13(1), pages 12-21.
- Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, September.
- Haggard, Stephan & Tiede, Lydia, 2011. "The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 673-685, May.
- Wolfgang Keller & Carol H. Shiue, 2016.
"Market Integration as a Mechanism of Growth,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
6070, CESifo.
- Keller, Wolfgang & Shiue, Carol, 2016. "Market Integration as a Mechanism of Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 11627, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Katja Kalkschmied, 2020.
"Rebundling Institutions,"
Graz Economics Papers
2020-03, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Kalkschmied, Katja, 2022. "Rebundling Institutions," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264064, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Czeglédi, Pál, 2009. "A tulajdonjogi biztonság szerepe a technológia elterjedésében [The role of property-law security in the spread of technology]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 790-813.
- Beck, T.H.L., 2010.
"Legal Institutions and Economic Development,"
Other publications TiSEM
8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Discussion Paper 2010-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Beck, Thorsten, 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 8139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Williamson, Claudia R., 2012. "Dignity and development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 763-771.
- Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The legacy of representation in medieval Europe for incomes and institutions today," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(1), pages 414-448, July.
- Kalkschmied, Katja, 2023. "Rebundling Institutions: How property rights and contracting institutions combine for growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 477-500.
- Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
- Braunfels, Elias, 2016. "Further Unbundling Institutions," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 13/2016, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
- Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Sekkat, Khalid, 2022.
"A time to throw stones, a time to reap: how long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?,"
Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 429-443, June.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2016. "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: How long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?," Working Papers CEB 16-016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2021. "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: How long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/328681, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Sébastien MARCHAND, 2010.
"Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis: Evidences from Deforestation,"
Working Papers
201016, CERDI.
- Sébastien Marchand, 2011. "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis: Evidences from Deforestation," CERDI Working papers halshs-00552243, HAL.
- Sébastien Marchand, 2011. "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis: Evidences from Deforestation," Working Papers halshs-00552243, HAL.
- Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, 2011. "Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 537-572.
- Christian Bjørnskov & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2012. "Trust as the missing root of institutions, education, and development," Working Papers CEB 12-031, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:67:y:2020:i:3:p:231-247. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sesssea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.