Conservative central banks: how conservative should a central bank be?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12149
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2007.
"Central Bank transparency in theory and practice,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 760-789, December.
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Demertzis, Maria, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice," CEPR Discussion Papers 3639, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Demertzis, Maria & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2003. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 56, Royal Economic Society.
- Maria Demertzis & Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Central bank transparency in theory and practice," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 23, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
- DEMERTZIS Maria & HUGHES HALLETT Andrew, 2010. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice," EcoMod2003 330700041, EcoMod.
- Morten O. Ravn & Harald Uhlig, 2002. "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375.
- Caputo, Rodrigo & Herrera, Luis Oscar, 2017. "Following the leader? The relevance of the Fed funds rate for inflation targeting countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 25-52.
- Hallett, Andrew Hughes, 2004. "A Central Bank For All Seasons? The “Lower Inflation At No Cost” Proposition Under Conditions Of Political Uncertainty," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 207-225, April.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2007.
"Unions, Fiscal Policy And Central Bank Transparency,"
Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 75(5), pages 617-633, September.
- Giuseppe Ciccarone & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Unions, fiscal policy and central bank transparency," Macroeconomics 0508004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Giuseppe Ciccarone & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Supply- side Fiscal Policy, Conservativeness, and Central Bank trasparency," Working Papers in Public Economics 77, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2004.
"Central banks and information provided to the private sector,"
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(230), pages 265-295.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2004. "Central banks and information provided to the private sector," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(230), pages 265-295.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2002. "Central banks and information provided to the private sector," Working Papers in Public Economics 61, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Central banks and information provided to the private sector," Macroeconomics 0504025, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Apr 2005.
- Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Central Banks and Information Provided to the Private Sector," Macroeconomics 0311009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019.
"Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy And Psychology," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19105, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Crosby, Mark, 1998.
"Central bank independence and output variability,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 67-75, July.
- Crosby, M., 1996. "Central Bank Independence and Output Variability," Papers 96/20, New South Wales - School of Economics.
- Franz R. Hahn & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Zur Fundierung des Designs des Europäischen Zentralbanksystems," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 72(1), pages 49-60, January.
- Andrew Hallett & Jan Libich, 2012. "Explicit inflation targets and central bank independence: friends or foes?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(4), pages 271-297, November.
- Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015.
"Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics,"
Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Crowley, Patrick M. & Hallett, Andrew Hughes, 2018. "What causes business cycles to elongate, or recessions to intensify?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 338-349.
- Walsh, Carl E, 2003. "Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 829-849, October.
- Taniya Ghosh & Yadavindu Ajit, 2023. "Central bank transparency, the role of institutions and inflation persistence," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2023-012, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Mr. Helmut Wagner, 2001. "Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy," IMF Working Papers 2001/184, International Monetary Fund.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester & Schaling, Eric & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998.
"Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 73-88, February.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1997. "Central Bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Discussion Paper 1997-10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1997. "Central bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Other publications TiSEM 59020a3a-1cb8-4e8f-a2b8-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1998. "Central bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Other publications TiSEM ebcf989c-472b-4d24-b7c2-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1997. "Central Bank independence : A sensitivity analysis," Other publications TiSEM 4bd0c7cd-5e22-41ff-8074-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians?,"
Working Papers
238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2009, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000638, David K. Levine.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1130, CESifo.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 10241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Furceri, Davide & Karras, Georgios, 2006. "Are the new EU members ready for the EURO?: A comparison of costs and benefits," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 25-38, January.
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan, 2006. "Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016.
"The Politics of Central Bank Independence,"
Other publications TiSEM
54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 34d07610-3844-4cf9-baa5-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Francesco Papadia & Gian Ruggiero, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-90, February.
- Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo Soares, 2004. "Political uncertainty and monetary unions," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 24(1), May.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:65:y:2018:i:1:p:97-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sesssea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.