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Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption

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  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single‐winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.

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  • Roger B. Myerson, 2006. "Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 727-742, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:4:p:727-742
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Testa, Cecilia, 2012. "Is polarization bad?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1104-1118.
    2. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
    3. Evrenk Haldun, 2009. "A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, December.
    4. Enriqueta Aragonès & Javier Rivas & Áron Tóth, 2019. "Voter Heterogeneity and Political Corruption," Working Papers 1121, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency," Working Papers 2008-4, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
    6. Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska, 2014. "Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses," Annales. Ethics in Economic Life, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, vol. 17(4), pages 79-92, December.
    7. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    8. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Rivas, Javier & Tóth, Áron, 2020. "Voter heterogeneity and political corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 206-221.
    9. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.

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