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Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses

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  • Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska

    (University of Lodz)

Abstract

The ongoing process of democratisation lead to the growing importance of the electoral systems that regulate the procedures of gaining and legitimizing power in democracy. Taking it into account it is worth asking about the relationship between these particular ‘game rules’ contained into electoral law and the respect of the rule of law, being one of the basic norms of a democratic system. A question then may be raised about the existence and the character of the relation between electoral systems and the level of political corruption. It is worth noticing that besides the research conducted by political scientists and the representatives of various branches of social sciences the significant analysis of the issue have been presented by the economists. In this article a brief overview of the economic studies on the relationship between level of political corruption and the electoral systems is presented so as to assess to what degree this approach may be treated as fruitful.

Suggested Citation

  • Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska, 2014. "Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses," Annales. Ethics in Economic Life, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, vol. 17(4), pages 79-92, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ann:journl:v:17:y:2014:i:4:p:79-92
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    File URL: http://www.annalesonline.uni.lodz.pl/archiwum/2014/2014_4_dzionekkozlowska_79_92.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lavinia DudaÈ™ & Lavinia MihiÈ›, 2019. "What Shapes Elections and Corruption in Emerging and Developing Countries ?," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(1), pages 195-201, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; electoral system; economics imperialism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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