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Vernon Smith's Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as Experimental Science

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  • Theodore C. Bergstrom

Abstract

This is a commentary on Vernon Smith's contributions to experimental economics
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2003. "Vernon Smith's Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as Experimental Science," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(2), pages 181-205, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:105:y:2003:i:2:p:181-205
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.t01-1-00004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
    2. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    3. Bergstrom, Theodore & Simon, Carl P. & Titus, Charles J., 1983. "Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 167-184, October.
    4. Ross M. Miller & Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith, 1977. "Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 91(4), pages 599-624.
    5. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
    6. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    7. Chen, Yan, 2008. "Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 67, pages 625-643, Elsevier.
    8. Isaac, R Mark & Plott, Charles R, 1981. "Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 448-459, June.
    9. Smith, Vernon L & Williams, Arlington W, 1981. "On Nonbinding Price Controls in a Competitive Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 467-474, June.
    10. Vernon L. Smith, 1965. "Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 387-387.
    11. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 289-301.
    12. Smith,Vernon L., 2005. "Bargaining and Market Behavior," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521021487, October.
    13. Jeffrey S. Banks & Charles R. Plott & David P. Porter, 1988. "An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(2), pages 301-322.
    14. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
    15. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    16. Robert E. Kuenne (ed.), 1990. "Microeconomics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 564.
    17. Knut Wicksell, 1958. "A New Principle of Just Taxation," International Economic Association Series, in: Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock (ed.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pages 72-118, Palgrave Macmillan.
    18. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1984. "Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(4), pages 983-1010, September.
    19. Smith, Vernon L, 1989. "Theory, Experiment and Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 151-169, Winter.
    20. Porter, David P & Smith, Vernon L, 1995. "Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(4), pages 509-541, October.
    21. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. "Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
    22. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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    2. Gunessee, Saileshsingh & Lane, Tom, 2023. "Changing perceptions about experimentation in economics: 50 years of evidence from principles textbooks," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    3. Saileshsingh Gunessee & Tom Lane, 2020. "Is Economics An Experimental Science? A Textbook Perspective," Discussion Papers 2020-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Alessandro Innocenti, 2004. "Paradoxes versus formalism in economics. Evidence from the early years of game theory and experimental economics," Department of Economics University of Siena 433, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    5. Giocoli, Nicola, 2005. "Mathematics as the role model for neoclassical economics (Blanqui Lecture)," MPRA Paper 33806, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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