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The Democratic Deficit And Inflation Targeting

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  • S.A. DU PLESSIS

Abstract

There is widespread consensus that a goal dependent, but instrument independent central bank solves the democratic deficit. However, the standard solution to the democratic deficit risks reintroducing the biases of political control over monetary policy through the power of politicians to change the monetary policy rule. This paper considers the problem as an instance of the paradox of power in the sphere of monetary policy and proposes a solution drawing on criteria for the rule of law and the principles of constitutional economics. Finally a normative test of inflation targeting is proposed, again drawing on the constitutional economics literature.

Suggested Citation

  • S.A. Du Plessis, 2005. "The Democratic Deficit And Inflation Targeting," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 73(1), pages 93-104, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:sajeco:v:73:y:2005:i:1:p:93-104
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1813-6982.2005.00007.x
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    1. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn A. King, 1997. "Independence and Accountability," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Iwao Kuroda (ed.), Towards More Effective Monetary Policy, chapter 10, pages 299-340, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Christina D. Romer & David Romer, 1999. "Monetary policy and the well-being of the poor," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 84(Q I), pages 21-49.
    3. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    4. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    5. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1997. "Institutions for Monetary Stability," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 307-334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    7. Stanley Fischer, 1995. "Modern Approaches to Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 5064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sean J. Gossel & Nicholas Biekpe, 2013. "The Cyclical Relationships Between South Africa's Net Capital Inflows and Fiscal and Monetary Policies," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(2), pages 64-83, March.
    2. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
    3. Janine Aron & John Muellbauer, 2009. "Monetary Policy and Inflation Modeling in a More Open Economy in South Africa," Chapters, in: Gill Hammond & Ravi Kanbur & Eswar Prasad (ed.), Monetary Policy Frameworks for Emerging Markets, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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