IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/reviec/v8y2000i4p681-697.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative Versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Joachim Schleich
  • David Orden

Abstract

This paper characterizes environmental quality and industry protection in a large‐country Grossman–Helpman model when production or consumption externalities exist and governments decide noncooperatively or cooperatively on domestic and trade policies. Governments choose policies efficiently from among those available, but competitive lobbies may prefer less efficient regimes. Under restricted policy availability, political‐support effects can offset terms‐of‐trade effects on equilibrium outcomes, and inefficient trade policies can lead to higher environmental quality than efficient domestic policies. If governments cooperate, they can satisfy particular organized industries at lower costs to other lobbies and total welfare. This may result in lower environmental quality than noncooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Schleich & David Orden, 2000. "Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative Versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 681-697, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:8:y:2000:i:4:p:681-697
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9396.00250
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00250
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-9396.00250?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Joseph S Shapiro, 2021. "The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(2), pages 831-886.
    2. Sumeet Gulati, 2008. "Free trade and the burden of domestic policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 817-837, August.
    3. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    4. Taner Güney, 2015. "Environmental sustainability and pressure groups," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(6), pages 2331-2344, November.
    5. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    6. Stoschek, Barbara, 2007. "The political economy of environmental regulations and industry compensation," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 65, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    7. Huilan Tian, 2003. "Eco‐labelling scheme, environmental protection, and protectionism," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(3), pages 608-633, August.
    8. Gulati Sumeet, 2010. "Price and Quantity Policies in a Simple Political Economy Framework," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-16, October.
    9. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Anuj J. Mathew & Arijit Mukherjeea, 2011. "Strict environmental policy: An incentive for FDI," Faculty Working Papers 08/11, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    10. McAusland, Carol, 2008. "Trade, politics, and the environment: Tailpipe vs. smokestack," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 52-71, January.
    11. McAusland, Carol, 2005. "Harmonizing tailpipe policy in symmetric countries: Improve the environment, improve welfare?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 229-251, September.
    12. Yu-Bong Lai, 2006. "Interest Groups, Trade Liberalization, and Environmental Standards," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 34(2), pages 269-290, June.
    13. Joachim Fuenfgelt & Guenther G. Schulze, 2011. "Endogenous Environmental Policy when Pollution is Transboundary," Discussion Paper Series 14, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Feb 2011.
    14. McAusland, Carol, 2003. "Harmonizing Emissions Policy in Symmetric Countries: Improve the Environment, Improve Welfare?," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4cj0392t, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    15. Yu-Bong Lai, 2007. "The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 57-72, October.
    16. Persson, Lars, 2012. "Environmental policy and lobbying in small open economies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 24-35.
    17. repec:got:cegedp:65 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Minoru Nakada, 2020. "The impact of environmental tax revenue allocation on the consequence of lobbying activities," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 335-349, December.
    19. Fünfgelt, Joachim & Schulze, Günther G., 2016. "Endogenous environmental policy for small open economies with transboundary pollution," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 294-310.
    20. Y. Hossein Farzin & Jinhua Zhao, 2003. "Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against Environmental Regulation," Working Papers 2003.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:8:y:2000:i:4:p:681-697. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.