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Bidding for Land Development

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  • David Whitaker

Abstract

This paper is concerned with applying an optimum bidding procedure, originally proposed by Friedman, to the purchase of development land. It is assumed that the vendor sells the land to the highest bidder in a sealed bid auction without any consideration of the design of the proposed development. Friedman's model for optimal bidding is introduced, and a case study is presented to demonstrate its applicability.

Suggested Citation

  • David Whitaker, 1981. "Bidding for Land Development," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 9(3), pages 223-233, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:9:y:1981:i:3:p:223-233
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.00241
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lawrence Friedman, 1956. "A Competitive-Bidding Strategy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(1), pages 104-112, February.
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