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Poverty and Governance: The Contest for Aid

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  • Gil S. Epstein
  • Ira N. Gang

Abstract

Countries compete with one another for funds distributed by non-government organizations (NGOs). The authors consider a competition over poverty and governance conducted by a non-government organization trying to allocate its funds among potential recipient countries. In its decision-making the NGO also takes into account the initial conditions each potential recipient faces, including the current quality of governance and wealth (poverty). For example, all else being equal the poorer country will have a higher probability of obtaining funds; or, the better the applicant's governance, the more its gains. Moreover, the maximum aid a country can obtain depends on its wealth. Investment in good governance, the wealth/poverty status of the applicant, and its current quality of governance will, together, determine the funds potential recipients expect to obtain. The authors also consider recent changes in the levels of these factors. They want to understand the roles these factors play in the competition for aid and the outcome for the quality of governance. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2009. "Poverty and Governance: The Contest for Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(s1), pages 382-392, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:13:y:2009:i:s1:p:382-392
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
    2. George Mavrotas & Espen Villanger, 2006. "Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2006-02, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 1997. "Competition for aid and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 369-385, November.
    4. Sajal Lahiri & Katharina Michaelowa, 2006. "Editorial: The Political Economy of Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 177-178, May.
    5. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "The Politics of Randomness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 423-433, October.
    6. Jac C. Heckelman & Stephen Knack, 2008. "Foreign Aid and Market‐Liberalizing Reform," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 524-548, August.
    7. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006. "Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 285-296, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brück, Tilman & Xu, Guo, 2012. "Who gives aid to whom and when? Aid accelerations, shocks and policies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 593-606.
    2. Lawrence Sáez, 2013. "Methods in governance research: a review of research approaches," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-017-13, GDI, The University of Manchester.

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