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Leasehold or Freehold? Leader‐Eviction Rules in the British Conservative and Labour Parties

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  • Thomas Quinn

Abstract

This paper examines how leader‐eviction rules affect the security of tenure of party leaders in the British Conservative and Labour parties. It sets out a framework for analysing and comparing eviction rules based on the political risks and institutional costs incurred by challengers and selectors alike in removing incumbents. Entering a contest entails mobilisation costs as challengers seek the backing of allies. Political risks are increased for the incumbent's rivals if they must stand directly against the incumbent in a contest. In contrast, rules that separate incumbent eviction and replacement enable rivals to freeride on the evicting efforts of other actors, significantly diminishing the incumbent's security of tenure. This paper looks at three systems: the Labour Party's electoral college, the Conservative Party's parliamentary ballot system and the Tories’ new parliamentary mass‐membership hybrid. High nomination barriers and the necessity to challenge the incumbent directly make Labour leaders secure. Eviction costs are lower in the two Conservative systems. This paper also argues that a party's eviction rules must be viewed in the context of its broader internal distribution of power: as party leaders gain more power over decision‐making, raising barriers to challengers may simply encourage internal opponents to rebel or exit.

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  • Thomas Quinn, 2005. "Leasehold or Freehold? Leader‐Eviction Rules in the British Conservative and Labour Parties," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(4), pages 793-815, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:53:y:2005:i:4:p:793-815
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00557.x
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    1. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
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