IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v90y1996i02p331-343_20.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond

Author

Listed:
  • Goodin, Robert E.

Abstract

Many bemoan divided government and the consequent deadlock of democracy. The logic of The Federalist arguably defends it, in ways heretofore unappreciated, by appeal to a least-common-denominator definition of the “public interest.” That quasi-Federalist logic is explored, and alternative political structures are assessed against the public interest criterion to which it appeals. Another and more defensible notion of the public interest is introduced, and its very different political styles, institutions, and policies are adduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodin, Robert E., 1996. "Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 331-343, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:02:p:331-343_20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400206230/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shitao Gong & Xin Gao & Zhou Li & Linyan Chen, 2021. "Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(7), pages 1-29, March.
    2. Dellaportas, Steven & Davenport, Laura, 2008. "Reflections on the public interest in accounting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 19(7), pages 1080-1098.
    3. Jude Browne, 2020. "The Regulatory Gift: Politics, regulation and governance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 203-218, April.
    4. André Bächtiger & Dominik Hangartner, 2010. "When Deliberative Theory Meets Empirical Political Science: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in Political Deliberation," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(4), pages 609-629, October.
    5. Mansbridge, Jane J., 2009. "Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations," Scholarly Articles 4415943, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    6. Andreas Føllesdal, 2002. "Drafting a European Constitution – Challenges and Opportunities," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0017, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
    7. Arend Lijphart, 2003. "DEBATE: Measurement Validity and Institutional Engineering – Reflections on Rein Taagepera's Meta‐Study," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 51(1), pages 20-25, March.
    8. Rein Taagepera, 2003. "Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy: Logical Connections and Institutional Design," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 51(1), pages 1-19, March.
    9. Evan Osborne, 1998. "A theory of gridlock: Strategic behavior in legislative deliberations," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(3), pages 238-251, September.
    10. Whetsell, Travis A, 2023. "On the Theory of the Pragmatic Public," SocArXiv 8ukmr, Center for Open Science.
    11. Thomas Clark Durant & Michael Weintraub & Daniel Houser & Shuwen Li, 2018. "Trust in the executive," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(5), pages 609-624, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:02:p:331-343_20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.