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An Assessment of Factors Important to Legislators in Budget Decisions; How Much Impact Can Agencies Have?

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  • Arvy Smith
  • Jason L. Jensen

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  • Arvy Smith & Jason L. Jensen, 2017. "An Assessment of Factors Important to Legislators in Budget Decisions; How Much Impact Can Agencies Have?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 112-133, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:37:y:2017:i:3:p:112-133
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Davis, Otto A. & Dempster, M. A. H. & Wildavsky, Aaron, 1966. "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 529-547, September.
    2. Sharkansky, Ira, 1968. "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 1220-1231, December.
    3. Hofferbert, Richard I., 1966. "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 73-82, March.
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