An Expert at Work: Revisiting Jeremy Bentham's Proposals on Codification
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2008.00414.x
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2002.
"What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 402-435, June.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "What can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?," IEW - Working Papers 080, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2001. "What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?," CESifo Working Paper Series 503, CESifo.
- Susan Feigenbaum & David M. Levy, 1996. "The Technological Obsolescence Of Scientific Fraud," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(3), pages 261-276, August.
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986.
"Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
- Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 749, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Cowen, Tyler & Sutter, Daniel, 1997. "Politics and the Pursuit of Fame," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(1-2), pages 19-35, October.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001.
"A Model of Expertise,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001.
"Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
- Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 1999. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," NBER Working Papers 7158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2000. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0341, Econometric Society.
- Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2006. "Reputational cheap talk," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 155-175, March.
- Levy, David M., 2001. "How the Dismal Science Got its Name: Debating Racial Quackery," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 5-35, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Couyoumdjian, Juan Pablo, 2012. "Are institutional transplants viable? An examination in light of the proposals by Jeremy Bentham," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 489-509, December.
- Slavisa Tasic, 2013. "Mind Matters," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 403-416, August.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
- Li Hao & Wing Suen, 2009.
"Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 359-392, May.
- Li Hao & Wing Suen, 2009. "Viewpoint: Decision‐making in committees," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(2), pages 359-392, May.
- Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011.
"The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, September.
- Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," MPRA Paper 34813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Persson, Petra, 2018.
"Attention manipulation and information overload,"
Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 78-106, May.
- Persson, Petra, 2013. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," Working Paper Series 995, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Petra Persson, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," NBER Working Papers 23823, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Petra, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," CEPR Discussion Papers 12297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2023.
"Competition in costly talk,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Chan, Jimmy & Suen, Wing, 2009.
"Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 799-814, October.
- Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2003. "Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition," Economics Working Paper Archive 497, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
- Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014.
"Dynamic strategic information transmission,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
- Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
- Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016.
"Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 91-108.
- Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 19807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González, 2011. "Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma of Participative Decision Making," Working Papers 11-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2012. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-134/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
- Esra E. Bayindir & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2020.
"Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-22, April.
- Bayindir, Esra E. & Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2019. "Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication," MPRA Paper 97152, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lagerlof, Johan & Frisell, Lars, 2004.
"Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," Public Economics 0402003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Johan Lagerlöf & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," Microeconomics 0402013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2019. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(2), pages 127-143, June.
- Marco Battaglini, 2002.
"Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
- Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
- Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2012.
"When second opinions hurt: A model of expert advice under career concerns,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-16.
- Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When Second Opinions Hurt: A Model of Expert Advice under Career Conce rns," Working Papers 2010-08, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
- Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
- Hongbin Cai, 2009. "Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 173-189, March.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:61:y:2008:i:4:p:503-519. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.