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Indecision Theory: Weight of Evidence and Voting Behavior

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  • PAOLO GHIRARDATO
  • JONATHAN N. KATZ

Abstract

In this paper, we show how to incorporate weight of evidence, or ambiguity, into a model of voting behavior. We do so in the context of the turnout decision of instrumentally rational voters who differ in their perception of the ambiguity of the candidates' policy positions. Ambiguity is reflected by the fact that the voter's beliefs are given by a set of probabilities, each of which represents in the voter's mind a different possible scenario. We show that a voter who is averse to ambiguity considers abstention strictly optimal when the candidates' policy positions are both ambiguous and they are “ambiguity complements.” Abstaining is preferred since it is tantamount to mixing the prospects embodied by the two candidates, thus enabling the voter to “hedge” the candidates' ambiguity.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Ghirardato & Jonathan N. Katz, 2006. "Indecision Theory: Weight of Evidence and Voting Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(3), pages 379-399, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:3:p:379-399
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00269.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Lockwood, Ben, 2017. "Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(4), pages 471-501, February.
    2. Meyer, Jacob & Rentschler, Lucas, 2023. "Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 381-410.
    3. Ben Lockwood & James Rockey, 2020. "Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(632), pages 2619-2648.
    4. Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, 2009. "The Participatory Effects of Redistricting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 1006-1023, October.
    5. Bracco, Emanuele & Revelli, Federico, 2018. "Concurrent elections and political accountability: Evidence from Italian local elections," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 135-149.
    6. Marciano Siniscalchi, 2009. "Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes Toward Variation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 801-855, May.
    7. Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Partisan Voting Under Uncertainty," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_574, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    8. Alexander James & Nathaly M. Rivera & Brock Smith, 2022. "Cash Transfer and Voter Turnout," Working Papers wp536, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    9. Charles F. Manski, 2013. "Status Quo Deference and Policy Choice under Ambiguity," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(1), pages 116-128, March.
    10. Daiki Kishishita, 2018. "Emergence of populism under ambiguity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(6), pages 1559-1562, December.
    11. Cosmin L. Ilut & Martin Schneider, 2022. "Modeling Uncertainty as Ambiguity: a Review," NBER Working Papers 29915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kishishita, Daiki, 2020. "(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    13. Benjamin Lockwood, 2015. "Voter Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability," CESifo Working Paper Series 5415, CESifo.

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