IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v11y2009i1p1-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies

Author

Listed:
  • MARC FLEURBAEY
  • YVES SPRUMONT

Abstract

We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population. We extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when cost shares cannot be negative, i.e., agents cannot receive subsidies from others. We adapt the Maniquet–Sprumont defense of public good welfare egalitarianism to this context. Weakening their Free Lunch Aversion axiom and adding a continuity requirement allows us to characterize the public good welfare maximin social ordering function.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Fleurbaey & Yves Sprumont, 2009. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:1:p:1-8
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01393.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01393.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01393.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-976, July.
    2. François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2004. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 627-640, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. MANIQUET, François, 2014. "Social ordering functions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2008. "Equal sacrifice and fair burden-sharing in a public goods economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 415-429, August.
    2. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
    3. Maniquet, Francois & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 155-174, February.
    4. Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, 2012. "A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 647-657.
    5. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2007. "Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 157-169, October.
    6. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, François, 2017. "Fairness and well-being measurement," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-126.
    7. Robert Scherf & Matthew Weinzierl, 2020. "Understanding Different Approaches to Benefit‐Based Taxation," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(2), pages 385-410, June.
    8. Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio, 2017. "A Fairness Justification of Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1261-1276, July.
    9. Aitor Calo-Blanco, 2015. "Health, responsibility and taxation with a fresh start," Working Papers 15.06, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    10. Hines Jr., James R., 2000. "What is benefit taxation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 483-492, March.
    11. Fleurbaey, Marc & Leroux, Marie-Louise & Ponthiere, Gregory, 2014. "Compensating the dead," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 28-41.
    12. Matthew Weinzierl, 2018. "Revisiting the Classical View of Benefit‐based Taxation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(612), pages 37-64, July.
    13. Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
    14. Kaplow, Louis, 2006. "Public goods and the distribution of income," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1627-1660, October.
    15. Nicolo, Antonio & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 221-243, March.
    16. Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi, 2020. "Can everyone benefit from innovation?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 187-191.
    17. Marc Fleurbaey & Marie-Louise Leroux & Grégory Ponthière, 2010. "Compensating the dead? Yes we can!," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564934, HAL.
    18. Hahn, Kyungdong & Gilles, Robert P., 1998. "Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 173-178, August.
    19. Miguel Gines & Francisco Marhuenda, 1996. "Cost monotonic mechanisms," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 89-103, January.
    20. Borm, P.E.M. & Ju, Y. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 1)," Other publications TiSEM 9b03ea4a-f625-4fd0-ad4f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:1:p:1-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.