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Cost monotonic mechanisms

Author

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  • Miguel Gines

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Francisco Marhuenda

    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

We study the existence of cost monotonic selections of the core in economies with several public goods. Under quasilinear utilities there is a cost inonotonic core selection mechanism if and only if the agents order the bundles of public goods equally. If this is indeed the case, any such mechanism must choose an egalitarian equivalent allocation. The equal ordering property is no longer required in the case of economies with quasi-linear separable utility functions and separable costs. In this set up, there is essentially only one cost monotoiiic mechanism. Furthermore, it has to select an egalit arian equivalent allocation.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Gines & Francisco Marhuenda, 1996. "Cost monotonic mechanisms," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 89-103, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:20:y:1996:i:1:p:89-103
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-976, July.
    2. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    3. Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
    4. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 1992. "An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1331-1349, November.
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    1. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    2. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
    3. Luis Corchón & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1995. "A Note On Stability Of Best Reply And Gradient Systems With Applications To Imperfectly Competitive Models," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es & Luis C. Corch?n & Simon Wilkie, "undated". "Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 493.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    5. María Dolores Guilló, 1995. "Terms-Of-Trade And The Current Account: A Two-Country/Two-Sector Growth Model," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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