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Service on a Stigmatized Board, Social Capital, and Change in Number of Directorships

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  • Kurt A. Wurthmann

Abstract

This article seeks to develop a nuanced understanding about the relationship between service on a stigmatized board and reduced opportunities for future directorships on other boards by examining the moderating effects of different dimensions of director social capital on this relationship. Evidence based on a unique sample of firms with boards that were viewed as being stigmatized by a group of corporate governance experts suggests that while serving on a stigmatized board is related to a reduction in future number of directorships held, this relationship is significantly mitigated for directors of upper-class origins. However, social capital related to affiliations with other elite institutions does not appear to mitigate reduction in future number of directorships held by outside directors who serve on a stigmatized board. Implications and future directions in research on class-based influence in the corporate community and stigmatization and devaluation of elites associated with corporate failures are discussed.

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  • Kurt A. Wurthmann, 2014. "Service on a Stigmatized Board, Social Capital, and Change in Number of Directorships," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 814-841, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jomstd:v:51:y:2014:i:5:p:814-841
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/joms.12087
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    Cited by:

    1. Baishya, Somnath & Karna, Amit & Mahapatra, Diptiranjan & Kumar, Satish & Mukherjee, Debmalya, 2025. "Dynamic managerial capabilities: A critical synthesis and future directions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Luciano Rossoni & Cezar Eduardo Aranha & Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva, 2018. "The Complexity of Social Capital: The Influence of Board and Ownership Interlocks on Implied Cost of Capital in an Emerging Market," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-12, February.
    3. Luciano Rossoni & Cezar Eduardo Aranha & Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva, 2018. "Does the capital of social capital matter? Relational resources of the board and the performance of Brazilian companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(1), pages 153-185, March.

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