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Effect Of Fed Policy Actions On The Default Likelihood Of Commercial Banks

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  • Aigbe Akhigbe
  • Jeff Madura
  • Anna D. Martin

Abstract

Using a measure of default likelihood based on an option pricing method, we provide evidence that Fed policy actions affect the financial distress of commercial banks. When the Fed increases (decreases) interest rates, the measure of default likelihood increases (decreases). We show that when the Fed uses a tight money policy, the increase in default likelihood is more pronounced for banks that have less capital, have greater financial leverage, are smaller, have fewer growth opportunities, and have lower asset quality. Additionally, the effects on bank default likelihood are more pronounced when the Fed's policy signals less concern about economic growth, as indicated by its bias toward further tightening, and when there is a market expectation of higher short‐term market rates in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Aigbe Akhigbe & Jeff Madura & Anna D. Martin, 2007. "Effect Of Fed Policy Actions On The Default Likelihood Of Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 30(1), pages 147-162, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:30:y:2007:i:1:p:147-162
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2007.00207.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ben Abdesslem, Rim & Chkir, Imed & Dabbou, Halim, 2022. "Is managerial ability a moderator? The effect of credit risk and liquidity risk on the likelihood of bank default," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Abuzayed, Bana & Al-Fayoumi, Nedal & Molyneux, Phil, 2018. "Diversification and bank stability in the GCC," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 17-43.
    3. Bruyland, Evy & Lasfer, Meziane & De Maeseneire, Wouter & Song, Wei, 2019. "The performance of acquisitions by high default risk bidders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 37-58.
    4. Xiaoqing Maggie Fu & Yongjia Rebecca Lin & Philip Molyneux, 2015. "Bank Competition and Financial Stability in Asia Pacific," Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions, in: Bank Competition, Efficiency and Liquidity Creation in Asia Pacific, chapter 3, pages 49-71, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Hagendorff, Jens & Vallascas, Francesco, 2011. "CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1078-1095, September.
    6. Evžen Kočenda & Ichiro Iwasaki, 2022. "Bank survival around the world: A meta‐analytic review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 108-156, February.
    7. Vallascas, Francesco & Keasey, Kevin, 2012. "Bank resilience to systemic shocks and the stability of banking systems: Small is beautiful," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1745-1776.
    8. Paul Kato & Jens Hagendorff, 2010. "Distance to default, subordinated debt, and distress indicators in the banking industry," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 50(4), pages 853-870, December.
    9. Al-Own, Bassam & Minhat, Marizah & Gao, Simon, 2018. "Stock options and credit default swaps in risk management," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 200-214.
    10. Francesco Vallascas & Jens Hagendorff, 2013. "CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(2), pages 47-89, May.

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