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Effects of One‐Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation

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  • Rabah Amir
  • John Wooders

Abstract

With one‐way spillovers, the standard symmetric two‐period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.

Suggested Citation

  • Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1999. "Effects of One‐Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 223-249, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:8:y:1999:i:2:p:223-249
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00223.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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