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Pollution Regulation and Incentives for Pollution‐Control Research

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  • Gary Biglaiser
  • John K. Horowitz

Abstract

We study the firm's incentives to engage in research for pollution‐control technologies and to adopt new technologies that if discovers or that are discovered by other firms. Licensing of discoveries is assumed possible. We also study the regulator's problem in designing optimal environmental regulations that both control pollution and provide incentives for research. Technology adoption standards are part of the optimal regulation. Another finding is that making the adoption standard stricter reduces research.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Biglaiser & John K. Horowitz, 1994. "Pollution Regulation and Incentives for Pollution‐Control Research," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(4), pages 663-684, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:3:y:1994:i:4:p:663-684
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00663.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401.
    6. Wright, Brian Davern, 1983. "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 691-707, September.
    7. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dietrich Earnhart & Sarah Jacobson & Yusuke Kuwayama & Richard T. Woodward, 2023. "Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(2), pages 203-221.
    2. Strandholm, John C. & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2021. "Pollution abatement with disruptive R&D investment," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    3. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Natacha Raffin, 2024. "Cooperation in green R &D and environmental policies: tax or standard," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 205-237, December.

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