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When You Ask Zeus A Favor: The Third Party'S Voice In A Dictator Game

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  • TETSUO YAMAMORI
  • KAZUHIKO KATO
  • AKIHIKO MATSUI

Abstract

We conducted a laboratory experiment on a dictator game with the option for a “voice” by a third party and compared it with the dictator game with a “voice” by the recipient. Our findings are as follows. The dictators' offers in response to an aggressive voice of the recipients are significantly lower than the dictators' offers in response to the corresponding voice of the third party. The dictators' responses to an aggressive voice differentiate the effects of the recipient's voice from those of the third party's.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuo Yamamori & Kazuhiko Kato & Akihiko Matsui, 2010. "When You Ask Zeus A Favor: The Third Party'S Voice In A Dictator Game," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 145-158, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:61:y:2010:i:2:p:145-158
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2009.00482.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Moreira, 2015. "The Perception of Economic Value Limits: A Study on the Ultimatum Game Decision Patterns," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 2503337, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.

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