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Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies

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  • Sereeparp Anantavrasilp
  • Abe de Jong
  • Douglas V. DeJong
  • Ulrich Hege

Abstract

This paper focuses on dominant owners’ use of leverage to finance their blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France where blockholders have tax incentives to structure their leverage in pyramidal holding companies and study the effect of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. We find no difference in payout policy and financial behavior during the 1999 to 2008 period between firms with levered owners and other firms. However, in the years 2009 to 2011 following the crisis, dividend payouts increase in proportion to pyramidal debt of dominant owners. We inspect pyramidal entities individually and find that on average only 60% of dividends are passed through to the ultimate owners, with the rest predominantly used to meet debt service obligations of the pyramidal entities.

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  • Sereeparp Anantavrasilp & Abe de Jong & Douglas V. DeJong & Ulrich Hege, 2020. "Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1-2), pages 253-292, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:47:y:2020:i:1-2:p:253-292
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12415
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    Cited by:

    1. Silvia Rossetto & Nassima Selmane & Raffaele Staglianò, 2023. "Ownership concentration and firm risk: The moderating role of mid‐sized blockholders," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1-2), pages 377-410, January.
    2. repec:hal:journl:hal-04659614 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Justin Hung Nguyen & Buhui Qiu, 2022. "The effect of skilled labor intensity on corporate dividend payouts," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5-6), pages 963-1010, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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