IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jacrfn/v18y2006i4p34-43.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Basel II: The Route Ahead or Cul‐de‐Sac?

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Brealey

Abstract

Despite the best efforts of regulators, banking crises throughout the world have been on the rise and proved costly both in terms of the burden on taxpayers and the effect on output. The revised Basel Accord establishes new procedures for measuring the risk of bank loans and for calculating the capital that needs to be held against these loans. But if these new rules are undoubtedly an improvement on the existing ones, their continued focus on the risk of individual loans suggests that bank regulation is heading down a cul‐de‐sac. Ideally, one would like to be able to view individual loans as parts of portfolios, with better diversified portfolios assigned lower risks and capital requirements. But because of the difficulty of measuring the risk of loan portfolios (which stems from their complicated covariance structure), the author suggests that the regulators and their constituencies would be better served by requiring more realistic valuations of loan portfolios and other bank assets. In this sense, the design of effective capital adequacy rules involves a trade‐off between developing developing more precise measures of risk, on the one hand, and improving the frequency and accuracy of asset valuations, on the other. The author urges bank regulators to focus less on refinements of risk measurement and more on efforts to incorporate fair value accounting.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Brealey, 2006. "Basel II: The Route Ahead or Cul‐de‐Sac?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 18(4), pages 34-43, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:34-43
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2006.00108.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2006.00108.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2006.00108.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Angelini & Laurent Clerc & Vasco Cúrdia & Leonardo Gambacorta & Andrea Gerali & Alberto Locarno & Roberto Motto & Werner Roeger & Skander Van den Heuvel & Jan Vlček, 2015. "Basel III: Long-term Impact on Economic Performance and Fluctuations," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(2), pages 217-251, March.
    2. Ernest Dautovic, 2019. "Has Regulatory Capital Made Banks Safer? Skin in the Game vs Moral Hazard," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    3. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Marquez, Robert, 2015. "Deposits and bank capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 601-619.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Müller, Jürg, 2015. "The macroeconomics of Modigliani–Miller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1081-1113.
    5. Leonardo Gambacorta & Sudipto Karmakar, 2018. "Leverage and Risk-Weighted Capital Requirements," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 14(5), pages 153-191, December.
    6. Allen, Bill & Chan, Ka Kei & Milne, Alistair & Thomas, Steve, 2012. "Basel III: Is the cure worse than the disease?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 159-166.
    7. Stephen Matteo Miller, 2018. "The recourse rule, regulatory arbitrage, and the financial crisis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 195-217, October.
    8. Barth, James R. & Miller, Stephen Matteo, 2018. "Benefits and costs of a higher bank “leverage ratio”," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 37-52.
    9. Miller, Steph & Hoarty, Blake, 2020. "On Regulation and Excess Reserves: The Case of Basel III," Working Papers 10243, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    10. Admati, Anat R. & DeMarzo, Peter M. & Hellwig, Martin F. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 2010. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive," Research Papers 2065, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    11. Miller, Stephen, 2017. "The Recourse Rule, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Financial Crisis," Working Papers 03097, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    12. James R. Barth & Stephen Matteo Miller, 2018. "On the Rising Complexity of Bank Regulatory Capital Requirements: From Global Guidelines to their United States (US) Implementation," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-33, November.
    13. Stephen Matteo Miller & Blake Hoarty, 2021. "On regulation and excess reserves: The case of Basel III," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 44(2), pages 215-247, June.
    14. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2013. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:34-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1078-1196 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.