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The macroeconomics of Modigliani–Miller

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  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Haller, Hans
  • Müller, Jürg

Abstract

We examine the validity of a macroeconomic version of the Modigliani–Miller theorem. By this, we mean that different capital structures can occur in equilibrium and that all of them are associated with the same allocation of commodities and the same welfare. We develop a general equilibrium model with two production sectors, risk-averse households, and financial intermediation by banks. Banks are funded by (safe) deposits and (outside) equity and monitor borrowers in lending. Two sets of equilibria emerge. These sets differ with regard to the debt-equity ratios of banks, investment in risky technologies, bank defaults, and whether first-best allocations are attained. Hence, the macroeconomic version of the Modigliani–Miller theorem fails to hold. Imposing minimum equity capital requirements, however, eliminates all inefficient equilibria and guarantees the validity of the macroeconomic version of the Modigliani–Miller theorem.

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  • Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Müller, Jürg, 2015. "The macroeconomics of Modigliani–Miller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1081-1113.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1081-1113
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Kogler, Michael, 2020. "Risk shifting and the allocation of capital: A Rationale for macroprudential regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    2. Papageorgiou, Stylianos, 2022. "Bank levy and household risk-aversion," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    3. León-Ledesma, Miguel & Orrillo, Jaime, 2021. "Production, bankruptcy, and financial policies under collateral constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 109-119.
    4. Bossone, Biagio, 2024. "A Modigliani-Miller theorem for the public finances of globalized economies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    5. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Papageorgiou, Stylianos, 2018. "Regulatory Competition in Banking: A General Equilibrium Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 12791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Salomon Faure & Hans Gersbach, 2022. "Loanable funds versus money creation in banking: a benchmark result," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 135(2), pages 107-149, March.
    7. Hans Gersbach, 2021. "Elections, the curse of competence and credence policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 491-511, March.
    8. Salomon Faure & Hans Gersbach, 2021. "On the money creation approach to banking," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 265-318, September.
    9. Ripamonti, Alexandre, 2020. "Financial institutions, asymmetric information and capital structure adjustments," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 75-83.
    10. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Papageorgiou, Stylianos, 2020. "Regulatory competition in banking: Curse or blessing?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    11. Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2021. "Deposit insurance and reinsurance," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 425-470, December.
    12. Miguel Leon-Ledesma & Jaime Orrillo, 2016. "Production and Endogenous Bankruptcy under Collateral Constraints," Studies in Economics 1610, School of Economics, University of Kent.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial intermediation; Banking; Capital structure; Modigliani–Miller; General equilibrium; Capital requirements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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