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The Price of Being a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI)

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  • Michel Dacorogna
  • Marc Busse

Abstract

After reviewing the notion of Systemically Important Financial Institution, we propose a first principles way to compute the price of the implicit put option that the State gives to such an institution. Our method is based on important results from extreme value theory, one for the aggregation of heavy†tailed distributions and the other one for the tail behavior of the value at risk versus the tail value at risk. We show that the value of the put option is proportional to the value at risk of the institution and thus would provide the wrong incentive to banks who are qualified as Systemically Important Financial Institutions. This wrong incentive exists even if the guarantee is not explicitly granted. We conclude with a proposal to make the institution pay the price of this option to a fund, whose task would be to guarantee the orderly bankruptcy of such an institution. This fund would function like an insurance selling a cover to clients.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Dacorogna & Marc Busse, 2017. "The Price of Being a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI)," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 17(4), pages 611-616, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:irvfin:v:17:y:2017:i:4:p:611-616
    DOI: 10.1111/irfi.12115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fulvio Corsi & Stefano Marmi & Fabrizio Lillo, 2016. "When Micro Prudence Increases Macro Risk: The Destabilizing Effects of Financial Innovation, Leverage, and Diversification," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 1073-1088, October.
    2. Richard Davies & Belinda Tracey, 2014. "Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of Scale Economies for Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(s1), pages 219-253, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Dacorogna & Juan-José Francisco Miguelez & Marie Kratz, 2016. "Risk neutral versus real-world distribution on puclicly listed bank corporations," Working Papers hal-01373071, HAL.
    2. A. Mantovi, 2019. "Information insensitivity, collateral flows and the logic of financial stability," Economics Department Working Papers 2019-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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