Liquidity provision and optimal bank regulation
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2007.00057.x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ron J. Feldman & Arthur J. Rolnick, 1998. "Fixing FDICIA: a plan to address the too-big-to-fail problem," Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 12(Mar), pages 2-22.
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- Shi Chen & Jeng-Yan Tsai & Rosemary Jou, 2016. "Equities of scope as merger incentives under capital regulation: narrow versus synergy banking valuation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(37), pages 3508-3525, August.
- repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201511261452 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2017. "An overlapping generations model of taxpayer bailouts of banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 71-80.
- Mariotto, Carlotta & Verdier, Marianne, 2015. "Innovation and competition in Internet and mobile banking: an industrial organization perspective," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 23/2015, Bank of Finland.
- Mariotto, Carlotta & Verdier, Marianne, 2015. "Innovation and competition in Internet and mobile banking: an industrial organization perspective," Research Discussion Papers 23/2015, Bank of Finland.
- Carlotta MARIOTTO & Marianne VERDIER, 2015. "Innovation and Competition in Internet and Mobile Banking: an Industrial Organization Perspective," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(99), pages 129-146, 3rd quart.
- repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201511261452 is not listed on IDEAS
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