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Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems

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  • Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo
  • Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo
  • Estela Sánchez Rodríguez

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  • Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo & Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo & Estela Sánchez Rodríguez, 2016. "Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 379-400, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:12:y:2016:i:4:p:379-400
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ijet.12101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-635, May.
    2. Potters, Jos & Sudholter, Peter, 1999. "Airport problems and consistent allocation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 83-102, July.
    3. Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2012. "Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 185-197.
    4. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Youngsub Chun & Cheng‐Cheng Hu & Chun‐Hsien Yeh, 2012. "Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 77-85, March.
    6. Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Allocation Rules for a Commonly Owned Technology: The Average Cost Lower Bound," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 490-507, May.
    7. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    8. Moulin, Herve, 1991. "Welfare bounds in the fair division problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 321-337, August.
    9. William Thomson, 2007. "Cost allocation and airport problems," RCER Working Papers 537, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo & Iago Núñez Lugilde & Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo & Estela Sánchez Rodríguez, 2023. "Refining the Lorenz‐ranking of rules for claims problems on restricted domains," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 526-558, September.
    2. González-Díaz, Julio & Mirás Calvo, Miguel Ángel & Quinteiro Sandomingo, Carmen & Sánchez Rodríguez, Estela, 2016. "Airport games: The core and its center," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 105-115.
    3. Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo & Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo & Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2021. "Considerations on the aggregate monotonicity of the nucleolus and the core-center," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 93(2), pages 291-325, April.

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