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Contextualizing Donors’ Interests: The United Nations’ Shaming of the United States’ Trade Partners

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  • Sara Kahn‐Nisser

Abstract

Human rights advocates, particularly intergovernmental organizations (IGO), consider donors’ interests when conducting human rights shaming. Allies of donors receive preferential treatment from IGOs. Do IGOs automatically treat allies of donors more leniently or do they consider the donors’ interests in the specific area being reviewed? This article argues that donor interest considerations are policy‐area‐specific. I substantiate this argument by analysing the association between shaming and partnership with the US, using a new dataset which measures shaming under the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). I use several analysis methods and data matching. The results indicate that having a trade agreement with the US is associated with receiving more criticism under the ICESCR. Rather than giving automatic preferential treatment to allies and partners of the UN’s main donor, the ICESCR committee adjusts its shaming to the US’s interest vis‐à‐vis its partners in the policy‐areas affected by the treaty.

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  • Sara Kahn‐Nisser, 2022. "Contextualizing Donors’ Interests: The United Nations’ Shaming of the United States’ Trade Partners," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 13(1), pages 48-61, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:glopol:v:13:y:2022:i:1:p:48-61
    DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.13019
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