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How German Labor Courts Decide: An Econometric Case Study

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  • Helge Berger
  • Michael Neugart

Abstract

Courts are an important element in the institutional framework of labor markets, often determining the degree of employment protection. German labor courts provide a vivid example in this regard. However, we know relatively little about court behavior. A unique dataset on German labor court verdicts reveals that social and other criteria like employee characteristics, the type of job, local labor market conditions and court composition influence court decisions. At least as striking is that workers’ chances to win depend on where and when their cases are filed. This generates considerable ex ante uncertainty about outcomes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Helge Berger & Michael Neugart, 2012. "How German Labor Courts Decide: An Econometric Case Study," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(1), pages 56-70, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:germec:v:13:y:2012:i:1:p:56-70
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    Cited by:

    1. Goerke, Laszlo & Neugart, Michael, 2015. "Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 50-62.
    2. Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2012. "Risk Aversion and Trade‐Union Membership," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 275-295, June.
    3. Uwe Jirjahn, 2013. "Der Beitrag der Arbeitsmarktökonomik zur Erforschung von Gewerkschaften und Tarifvertragsbeziehungen in Deutschland," Research Papers in Economics 2013-03, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    4. Andrea Garnero & Claudio Lucifora, 2020. "Turning A Blind Eye? Compliance To Minimum Wages And Employment," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def085, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    5. Uwe Jirjahn & Jens Mohrenweiser, 2016. "Owner-Managers and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(4), pages 815-845, December.
    6. Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2011. "Trade union membership and dismissals," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 810-821.
    7. Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2015. "Trade union membership and sickness absence: Evidence from a sick pay reform," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 13-25.
    8. Miguel Á. Malo & Ángel Martín-Román & Alfonso Moral, 2018. "“Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” in Spanish labour court rulings," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 497-525, June.
    9. García-Meca, Emma & García-Sánchez, Isabel-María & Martínez-Ferrero, Jennifer, 2015. "Board diversity and its effects on bank performance: An international analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 202-214.
    10. Tobias Brändle, 2017. "Flexible collective bargaining agreements: Still a moderating effect on works council behaviour?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(8), pages 1137-1153, December.
    11. Andrea Garnero & Claudio Lucifora, 2022. "Turning a ‘Blind Eye’? Compliance with Minimum Wage Standards and Employment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(356), pages 884-907, October.
    12. Bofinger, Peter & Buch, Claudia M. & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2013. "Gegen eine rückwärtsgewandte Wirtschaftspolitik. Jahresgutachten 2013/14 [Against a backward-looking economic policy. Annual Report 2013/14]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201314.

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