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Worthless companies

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  • J. B. Heaton

Abstract

Companies with worthless assets can have substantial efficient markets equity values and debt that trades near par if there is a probability that an irrational bidder will acquire the company. Even if most capital market participants recognize that the company's assets are worthless, efficient markets pricing of the worthless company's equity and debt precludes arbitrage, and it may be impossible to persuade the potential irrational bidder to abandon its plans. The worthless company hypothesis may shed light on the valuation of some high‐profile start‐ups, the 1990s dot‐com bubble, and the bad performance of some short sellers.

Suggested Citation

  • J. B. Heaton, 2018. "Worthless companies," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 24(5), pages 721-727, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:eufman:v:24:y:2018:i:5:p:721-727
    DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12167
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    References listed on IDEAS

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