Large Shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell†offs

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell†offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell†off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share†ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell†off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell†off proceeds. We find that non†executive directors' and CEO's share†ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell†offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell†off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non†executive directors' share†ownership and non†executive representation in the board.