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The role of political constraints in transition strategies

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  • Gerard Roland

Abstract

This paper trys to clarify the political economy arguments underlying the big bang and the gradualist approach to economic transition. The big bang approach emphasizes the importance of windows of opportunity when ex ante political constraints are less binding, whereas gradualist programmes are defended because of their higher ex ante political feasibility. Both approaches aim at achieving irreversibility, but through different means. The big bang approach emphasizes how speed in reforms may constrain a successor government, whereas the gradualist approach tries to design the sequencing of reforms so as to build, at each stage of transition, constituencies for further reform.
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  • Gerard Roland, 1994. "The role of political constraints in transition strategies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 2(1), pages 27-41, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:2:y:1994:i:1:p:27-41
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.1994.tb00102.x
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    1. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-1223, December.
    2. M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
    3. Roland, Gerard & Verdier, Thierry, 1994. "Privatization in Eastern Europe : Irreversibility and critical mass effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 161-183, June.
    4. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1992. "The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 889-906.
    5. Dewatripont, M & Roland, G, 1992. "The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 291-300, March.
    6. Roland, Gerard, 1994. "On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatisation and Restructuring," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1158-1168, September.
    7. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1997. "Structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1709-1733, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General

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