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Enterprise Bargaining, Union Structure and Wages

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  • STEVE DOWRICK

Abstract

Models of simultaneous bargaining games are used to analyze the wage outcomes associated with various systems of industrial relations, including bargaining by craft, enterprise, industry or the whole economy. Union structure is a key determinant with highest wage pressure occurring when unions are organized along craft lines at industry level Abandonment of centralized bargaining and the splintering of both union and employer organizations into craft and industry units may well lead both to higher aggregate wage pressure and to greater wage inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Dowrick, 1993. "Enterprise Bargaining, Union Structure and Wages," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 69(4), pages 393-404, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:69:y:1993:i:4:p:393-404
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1993.tb02120.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-497, June.
    2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    3. Daniel S. Hamermesh & James Grant, 1979. "Econometric Studies of Labor-Labor Substitution and Their Implications for Policy," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 14(4), pages 543-562.
    4. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July.
    5. Stewart, Mark B, 1990. "Union Wage Differentials, Product Market Influences and the Division of Rents," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1122-1137, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicole Gürtzgen, 2003. "Revisiting the Impact of Union Structures on Wages: Integrating Different Dimensions of Centralization," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(4), pages 519-542, December.
    2. Göddeke, Anna & Haucap, Justus & Herr, Annika & Wey, Christian, 2011. "Stabilität und Wandel von Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen aus wettbewerbsökonomischer Sicht," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 10, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    3. Thorsten Upmann & Julia Müller, 2014. "The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(2), pages 336-364, June.
    4. Elizabeth Webster & Yi‐Ping Tseng, 2002. "The Determinants of Relative Wage Change in Australia," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 35(1), pages 70-84, March.
    5. Stephen P. King, 1993. "Penalty Rates and Enterprise Bargaining," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 26(4), pages 58-64, October.
    6. Julia Müller & Thorsten Upmann, 2013. "Centralised Labour Market Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4470, CESifo.
    7. Gürtzgen, Nicole, 2005. "Rent-sharing : Does the Bargaining Regime Make a Difference? Theory and Empirical Evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-15, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. A. Jorge Padilla & Samuel Bentolila & Juan J. Dolado, 1996. "Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(4), pages 535-564, December.
    9. Calabuig, Vicente & Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel, 2002. "Union structure and incentives for innovation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 177-192, March.
    10. Miguel González-Maestre & Vicente Calabuig, 2000. "Union Structure And The Incentives For Innovation In Oligopoly," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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