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What Can We Learn About Congressional Politics From Dimensional Studies Of Roll‐Call Voting?

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  • Kenneth Koford

Abstract

How many dimensions are there in Congressional roll‐call votes? What do dimensions tell us about Congressional politics? Poole and Rosenthal have found one or a very few dimensions. Earlier work has identified problems with Poole and Rosenthal's dimensional fitting method. This paper finds additional problems, showing that when legislators’relative intensity of preferences varies across issues, the Poole and Rosenthal approach will fail. Specifically, while redistributive issues fit their model, distributive and regulative issues allow gains from trade, and thus vote‐trading and coalition‐building. Roll‐call data show voting patterns inconsistent with the Poole and Rosenthal model.

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  • Kenneth Koford, 1994. "What Can We Learn About Congressional Politics From Dimensional Studies Of Roll‐Call Voting?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 173-186, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:173-186
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00095.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilligan, Thomas W & Marshall, William J & Weingast, Barry R, 1989. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 35-61, April.
    2. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-675, September.
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    5. Kenneth Koford, 1990. "Dimensions, Transactions Costs And Coalitions In Legislative Voting," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 59-82, March.
    6. Stratmann, Thomas, 1995. "Logrolling in the U.S. Congress," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 441-456, July.
    7. Koford, Kenneth, 1989. "Dimensions in Congressional Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 949-962, September.
    8. Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard & Koford, Kenneth, 1991. "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 955-976, September.
    9. Poole, Keith T & Rosenthal, Howard, 1993. "The Enduring Nineteenth-Century Battle for Economic Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Act Revisited," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 837-860, October.
    10. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel P. Gitterman, 2013. "Remaking a Bargain: The Political Logic of the Minimum Wage in the United States," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(1), pages 3-36, March.

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