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The Variable Incumbency Advantage: New Voters, Redistricting, and the Personal Vote

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  • Scott W. Desposato
  • John R. Petrocik

Abstract

In this article we explore the personal vote costs of redistricting. After redistricting, incumbents often face significant numbers of new voters—voters that were previously in a different incumbent's district. Existing conceptualizations of the incumbency advantage suggest that the cost to incumbents of having new voters should be relatively small and predictable. We propose a different formulation: a variable incumbency advantage. We argue that any incumbency advantage among the electorate is a function of short‐term effects, partisanship, and electoral saliency. We use a massive untapped dataset of neighborhood‐level electoral data to test our model and to demonstrate how the intersection of the personal vote, redistricting, and short‐term environmental variables can provide a healthy margin to incumbents—or end their careers.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott W. Desposato & John R. Petrocik, 2003. "The Variable Incumbency Advantage: New Voters, Redistricting, and the Personal Vote," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 18-32, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:47:y:2003:i:1:p:18-32
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00002
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    Cited by:

    1. Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, 2009. "The Participatory Effects of Redistricting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 1006-1023, October.
    2. Jamie L. Carson & Gregory Koger & Matthew J. Lebo & Everett Young, 2010. "The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 598-616, July.
    3. Ari Hyytinen & Jaakko Meriläinen & Tuukka Saarimaa & Otto Toivanen & Janne Tukiainen, 2018. "When does regression discontinuity design work? Evidence from random election outcomes," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), pages 1019-1051, July.
    4. Hyytinen, Ari & Meriläinen, Jaakko & Saarimaa, Tuukka & Toivanen, Otto & Tukiainen, Janne, 2015. "Does Regression Discontinuity Design Work? Evidence from Random Election Outcomes," Working Papers 59, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Eamon McGinn & Shiko Maruyama, 2021. "Why Waste Your Vote? Informal Voting in Compulsory Elections in Australia," Working Paper Series 2021/02, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
    6. Tukiainen, Janne & Saarimaa, Tuukka & Hyytinen, Ari, 2013. "Seat competitiveness and redistricting: Evidence from voting on municipal mergers," Working Papers 38, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Hyytinen, Ari & Saarimaa, Tuukka & Tukiainen, Janne, 2014. "Electoral vulnerability and size of local governments: Evidence from voting on municipal mergers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 193-204.
    8. Ching-Hsing Wang, 2022. "The Effect of Political Donation on Election Outcomes: Evidence from Taiwan Legislative Elections," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(1), pages 21582440221, March.
    9. Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Seth C. McKee, 2014. "The Devil’s in the Details: Evaluating the One Person, One Vote Principle in American Politics," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 2(1), pages 4-31.

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