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The Electoral Costs Of Special Interest Politics When Voters Are Ignorant

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  • Amihai Glazer

Abstract

It is widely believed that the free‐rider problem and the incentives to build minimum winning coalitions cause politics to reflect the preferences of special interest groups. Nevertheless, if voters do not know all the positions of all the candidates, then a candidate who proposes policies that benefit the public at large may defeat a candidate who depends on the support of special interests. Moreover, even if the latter candidate can win, he must use a publicity strategy which allows any voter to hear of proposals that benefit groups other than the voter's.

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  • Amihai Glazer, 1989. "The Electoral Costs Of Special Interest Politics When Voters Are Ignorant," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 225-237, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:3:p:225-237
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00015.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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