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Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Taking Up Positions And Meeting Pressure

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  • Sverre Grepperud
  • Pål Andreas Pedersen

Abstract

This paper portrays voluntary agreements as a Nash‐bargaining game between the authorities and the polluting industry. Before bargaining starts, the authorities threaten to introduce emission licences if the negotiations come to nothing, while industry, by the use of lobbying campaigns, can make it politically costly to regulate by law. The most likely game of the ones considered is characterized by the authorities first announcing a level of licensing, whereupon industry will adjust its lobbying activity. This game results in a relatively defensive industry and authorities than other games under consideration.

Suggested Citation

  • Sverre Grepperud & Pål Andreas Pedersen, 2003. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Taking Up Positions And Meeting Pressure," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 303-321, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:303-321
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00126
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alkuin Kölliker, 2004. "Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Goods," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_3, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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