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Choosing Democracy

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  • B. Peter Rosendorff

Abstract

In an autocracy, the ruling elite allocates resources to unproductive contest activities in order to protect its power. This paper establishes that a flatter income distribution, a slow‐growing or shrinking capital stock, and a decrease in the relative size of the workforce increases the likelihood of a decision by the ruling elite to negotiate a transition to democracy. In a model of economic cooperation and political conflict, the losses from ceding control over the tax rate may be lower than the costs of defending minority privilege. These predictions are evaluated in the light of the South African and other recent transitions.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Peter Rosendorff, 2001. "Choosing Democracy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 1-29, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:1-29
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00081
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    Cited by:

    1. Ragnar Torvik & James A. Robinson & Mario Chacón, 2006. "When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia," Working Paper Series 7106, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    2. Martin Gassebner & Michael J. Lamla & James Raymond Vreeland, 2013. "Extreme Bounds of Democracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(2), pages 171-197, April.
    3. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    4. Armey, Laura E. & McNab, Robert M., 2012. "Democratization and civil war," MPRA Paper 42460, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. John A. Doces & Christopher S. P. Magee, 2015. "Trade and Democracy: A Factor-Based Approach," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 407-425, March.
    6. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
    7. Tridimas, George, 2015. "War, disenfranchisement and the fall of the ancient Athenian democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 102-117.
    8. Chun, Natalie & Hasan, Rana & Rahman, Muhammad Habibur & Ulubaşoğlu, Mehmet A., 2016. "The role of middle class in democratic diffusion," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 536-548.
    9. Christian Bachelder Holkeboer & James Raymond Vreeland, 2013. "Calling Democracies and Dictatorships: The Effect of Political Regime on International Long-Distance Rates," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 417-437, August.
    10. Pierre Salmon, 2017. "Is democracy exportable?," Working Papers halshs-01516493, HAL.

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