IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/econpa/v42y2023i1p72-91.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Be Wary of Paying Wounded Bulls – Capacity Markets in Australia's National Electricity Market

Author

Listed:
  • Tim Nelson
  • Joel Gilmore
  • Tahlia Nolan

Abstract

Australia's Energy Security Board is currently considering whether to pivot the east‐coast Australian National Electricity Market from an energy‐only market to include some form of capacity remuneration. This discussion is occurring during an unprecedented energy crisis where the wholesale market was suspended following a 275% increase in underlying wholesale energy prices. This article unpacks the root causes of the current energy crisis and how a traditional capacity market would have been ineffective in addressing it. We find that a traditional capacity market may provide windfall gains to wounded bull coal generators and be counterproductive in driving new investment in dispatchable technologies. Our recommendation is that policy‐makers should focus on utilising existing regulatory tools and a capacity reserve to insure against the unanticipated failures of ageing coal plants.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Nelson & Joel Gilmore & Tahlia Nolan, 2023. "Be Wary of Paying Wounded Bulls – Capacity Markets in Australia's National Electricity Market," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 42(1), pages 72-91, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:42:y:2023:i:1:p:72-91
    DOI: 10.1111/1759-3441.12374
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1759-3441.12374
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1759-3441.12374?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Quiggin, 1997. "Estimating the Benefits of Hilmer and Related Reforms," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 30(3), pages 256-272, September.
    2. Paul Simshauser, 2014. "From First Place to Last: The National Electricity Market's Policy-Induced ‘Energy Market Death Spiral’," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 47(4), pages 540-562, December.
    3. Malcolm Abbott, 2002. "Completing The Introduction Of Competition Into The Australian Electricity Industry," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 21(2), pages 1-13, June.
    4. Michael Grubb & David Newbery, 2018. "UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition:Emerging Lessons," The Energy Journal, , vol. 39(6), pages 1-26, November.
    5. Paul Simshauser & Thao Doan, 2009. "Emissions Trading, Wealth Transfers and the Wounded Bull Scenario in Power Generation," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 42(1), pages 64-83, March.
    6. Dominique Finon & Virginie Pignon, 2008. "Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: The quest for regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market," Post-Print hal-00716312, HAL.
    7. repec:bla:opecrv:v:32:y:2008:i:2:p:150-183 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Simshauser, Paul, 2020. "Merchant renewables and the valuation of peaking plant in energy-only markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    9. Jotzo, Frank & Mazouz, Salim, 2015. "Brown coal exit: A market mechanism for regulated closure of highly emissions intensive power stations," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 71-81.
    10. John Quiggin, 2001. "Market-Oriented Reform in the Australian Electricity Industry," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , vol. 12(1), pages 126-150, June.
    11. Tim Nelson & Fiona Orton & Tony Chappel, 2018. "Decarbonisation and wholesale electricity market design," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 62(4), pages 654-675, October.
    12. Paul Simshauser & Jude Ariyaratnam, 2014. "What is normal profit for power generation?," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 6(2), pages 152-178, May.
    13. Finon, Dominique & Pignon, Virginie, 2008. "Electricity and long-term capacity adequacy: The quest for regulatory mechanism compatible with electricity market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 143-158, September.
    14. Karsten Neuhoff & Laurens De Vries, 2004. "Insufficient Incentives for Investment," Working Papers EP42, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    15. Simshauser, Paul, 2010. "Vertical integration, credit ratings and retail price settings in energy-only markets: Navigating the Resource Adequacy problem," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 7427-7441, November.
    16. Paul Simshauser & Jude Ariyaratnam, 2014. "What is normal profit for power generation?," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 6(2), pages 152-178, May.
    17. Joskow, Paul L., 2008. "Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 159-170, September.
    18. Besser, Janet Gail & Farr, John G. & Tierney, Susan F., 2002. "The Political Economy of Long-Term Generation Adequacy: Why an ICAP Mechanism is Needed as Part of Standard Market Design," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(7), pages 53-62.
    19. Tim Nelson & Simon Kelley & Fiona Orton & Paul Simshauser, 2010. "Delayed Carbon Policy Certainty and Electricity Prices in Australia," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 29(4), pages 446-465, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Simshauser, Paul, 2019. "Missing money, missing policy and Resource Adequacy in Australia's National Electricity Market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    2. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Simshauser, Paul, 2020. "Merchant renewables and the valuation of peaking plant in energy-only markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    4. Simshauser, P., 2021. "Rooftop Solar PV and the Peak Load Problem in the NEM’s Queensland Region," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2180, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Nelson, Tim & Reid, Cameron & McNeill, Judith, 2015. "Energy-only markets and renewable energy targets: Complementary policy or policy collision?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 25-42.
    6. Simshauser, Paul, 2022. "Rooftop solar PV and the peak load problem in the NEM's Queensland region," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    7. Simshauser, P. & Gilmore, J., 2020. "Is the NEM broken? Policy discontinuity and the 2017-2020 investment megacycle," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2048, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Paul Simshauser, 2021. "Lessons from Australia's National Electricity Market 1998-2018: strengths and weaknesses of the reform experience," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Paul L. Joskow & Michael G. Pollitt (ed.), Handbook on Electricity Markets, chapter 9, pages 242-286, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Simshauser, Paul & Gilmore, Joel, 2022. "Climate change policy discontinuity & Australia's 2016-2021 renewable investment supercycle," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    10. Simshauser, Paul, 2018. "On intermittent renewable generation & the stability of Australia's National Electricity Market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 1-19.
    11. Tim Nelson & Fiona Orton & Tony Chappel, 2018. "Decarbonisation and wholesale electricity market design," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 62(4), pages 654-675, October.
    12. Simshauser, Paul & Tian, Yuan & Whish-Wilson, Patrick, 2015. "Vertical integration in energy-only electricity markets," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 35-56.
    13. Gohdes, Nicholas & Simshauser, Paul & Wilson, Clevo, 2023. "Renewable investments, hybridised markets and the energy crisis: Optimising the CfD-merchant revenue mix," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    14. Tim Nelson & Stephanie Bashir & Eleanor McCracken-Hewson & Michael Pierce, 2017. "The Changing Nature of the Australian Electricity Industry," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 36(2), pages 104-120, June.
    15. Gohdes, N.Nicholas & Simshauser,P. & Wilson, C., 2023. "Renewable investments in hybridised energy markets: optimising the CfD-merchant revenue mix," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2334, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Keppler, Jan Horst & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2022. "Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    17. Simshauser, Paul, 2018. "Garbage can theory and Australia's National Electricity Market: Decarbonisation in a hostile policy environment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 697-713.
    18. S. Oliveira, Fernando & William-Rioux, Bertrand & Pierru, Axel, 2023. "Capacity expansion in liberalized electricity markets with locational pricing and renewable energy investments," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(PB).
    19. Mastropietro, Paolo & Herrero, Ignacio & Rodilla, Pablo & Batlle, Carlos, 2016. "A model-based analysis on the impact of explicit penalty schemes in capacity mechanisms," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 406-417.
    20. Heidarizadeh, Mohammad & Ahmadian, Mohammad, 2019. "Capacity certificate mechanism: A step forward toward a market based generation capacity incentive," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 45-56.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:42:y:2023:i:1:p:72-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esausea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.