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Fast and Loose: An Evaluation of the PricewaterhouseCoopers Report Marriage Equality in Australia

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  • Brian Dollery
  • Michael A. Kortt

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  • Brian Dollery & Michael A. Kortt, 2017. "Fast and Loose: An Evaluation of the PricewaterhouseCoopers Report Marriage Equality in Australia," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 36(1), pages 49-59, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:36:y:2017:i:1:p:49-59
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2000. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-16, March.
    10. Saint-Martin, Denis, 2004. "Building the New Managerialist State: Consultants and the Politics of Public Sector Reform in Comparative Perspective," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269068.
    11. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, September.
    12. R. Urbatsch, 2012. "The paradox of voting intelligently," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 511-524, March.
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