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How Much Abatement Will Australia's Emissions Reduction Fund Buy?

Author

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  • Harry Clarke
  • Iain Fraser
  • Robert George Waschik

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecpa12097-abs-0001"> The economic implications for Australia for replacing its carbon tax policy with an Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) scheme are examined. A computable general equilibrium model is used to show that the budget allocated for the ERF provides about 50 per cent of that required to meet Australia's greenhouse gas abatement commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Harry Clarke & Iain Fraser & Robert George Waschik, 2014. "How Much Abatement Will Australia's Emissions Reduction Fund Buy?," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 33(4), pages 315-326, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:33:y:2014:i:4:p:315-326
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecpa.2015.33.issue-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fraser, Iain & Waschik, Robert, 2013. "The Double Dividend hypothesis in a CGE model: Specific factors and the carbon base," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 283-295.
    2. Harry Clarke & Robert Waschik, 2012. "Australia's Carbon Pricing Strategies in a Global Context," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(s1), pages 22-37, June.
    3. Stoneham, Gary & Chaudhri, Vivek & Ha, Arthur & Strappazzon, Loris, 2003. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria’s BushTender trial," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1-24.
    4. Gary Stoneham & Vivek Chaudhri & Arthur Ha & Loris Strappazzon, 2003. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 477-500, December.
    5. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521311120 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521322249 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Meng, Sam & Siriwardana, Mahinda & McNeill, Judith & Nelson, Tim, 2018. "The impact of an ETS on the Australian energy sector: An integrated CGE and electricity modelling approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 213-224.
    2. Paul J. Burke, 2016. "Undermined by Adverse Selection: Australia's Direct Action Abatement Subsidies," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 35(3), pages 216-229, September.
    3. McNeill, Judith, 2015. "A review of the economic modelling on the impacts of the Australian carbon tax," Conference papers 332598, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    4. Nong, Duy & Simshauser, Paul & Nguyen, Duong Binh, 2021. "Greenhouse gas emissions vs CO2 emissions: Comparative analysis of a global carbon tax," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 298(C).
    5. Nong, Duy & Meng, Sam & Siriwardana, Mahinda, 2017. "An assessment of a proposed ETS in Australia by using the MONASH-Green model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 281-291.
    6. John Freebairn, 2016. "A Comparison of Policy Instruments to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 35(3), pages 204-215, September.
    7. Nong, Duy & Siriwardana, Mahinda, 2018. "Potential impacts of the Emissions Reduction Fund on the Australian economy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 387-398.
    8. Nong, Duy, 2020. "Development of the electricity-environmental policy CGE model (GTAP-E-PowerS): A case of the carbon tax in South Africa," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    9. Meng, Xianming & Siriwardana, Mahinda & McNeill, Judith, 2015. "Will the direct action plan work?," Conference papers 332602, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    10. Siriwardana, Mahinda & Nong, Duy, 2015. "Australia in an International Emissions Trading (ETS) Scheme: An Economic Evaluation Using the GTAP-E Model," Conference papers 332632, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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