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A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets

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  • MASSIMO MOTTA
  • MICHELE RUTA

Abstract

This paper looks at the political economy of merger policy under autarky and in international markets. We assume that merger policy is decided by antitrust authorities (whose objective is to maximize welfare) but can be influenced by governments, which are subject to lobbying by the firms (be they insiders or outsiders to the merger). We argue that political economy distortions may explain some of the recently observed merger policy conflicts between authorities and politicians, as well as between institutions belonging to different countries. We illustrate our analysis with applications motivated by recent merger cases, which have been widely debated in the international press.
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Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Motta & Michele Ruta, 2012. "A Political Economy Model of Merger Policy in International Markets," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 79(313), pages 115-136, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:79:y:2012:i:313:p:115-136
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    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, November.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    4. Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2005. "Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 829-848, December.
    5. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
    6. Tomaso Duso & Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2007. "The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 455-489.
    7. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-1123, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jie Li & Jing Lu & Mobing Jiang, 2017. "Political Economy Model of Cross-Border Mergers Under Mixed Oligopoly," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 83-100, February.
    2. Laszlo Goerke, 2022. "Partisan competition authorities, Cournot‐oligopoly, and endogenous market structure," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(1), pages 238-270, July.
    3. Mariotti, Sergio & Marzano, Riccardo, 2021. "The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6).
    4. Stiebale, Joel, 2016. "Cross-border M&As and innovative activity of acquiring and target firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 1-15.
    5. Laszlo Goerke, 2022. "Endogenous Market Structure and Partisan Competition Authorities," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202201, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    6. Alcalde, Nuria & Powell, Ronan, 2022. "Government intervention in European mergers and acquisitions," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    7. Stiebale, Joel & Reize, Frank, 2011. "The impact of FDI through mergers and acquisitions on innovation in target firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 155-167, March.
    8. Jens Südekum, 2010. "National champions and globalization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(1), pages 204-231, February.
    9. Budzinski, Oliver, 2020. "The economics of international competition policy: New challenges in the light of digitization?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 135, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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