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Central Bank Independence And Inflation: A Note

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  • CHARLES T CARLSTROM
  • TIMOTHY S FUERST

Abstract

We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two‐thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the past two decades. (JEL E42, E58)

Suggested Citation

  • Charles T Carlstrom & Timothy S Fuerst, 2009. "Central Bank Independence And Inflation: A Note," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(1), pages 182-186, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:47:y:2009:i:1:p:182-186
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00148.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    4. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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