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Institutions And The Environment

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  • Elinor Ostrom

Abstract

Scholars have tended to recommend ‘optimal’ solutions for coping with open‐access problems related to common‐pool resources such as fisheries, forests and water systems. Examples exist of both successful and unsuccessful efforts to rely on private property, government property and community property. After briefly reviewing how the often‐recommended solutions have worked in the field, I suggest that institutional theorists move from touting simple, optimal solutions to analysing adaptive, multi‐level governance as related to complex, evolving resource systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Elinor Ostrom, 2008. "Institutions And The Environment," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 24-31, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:28:y:2008:i:3:p:24-31
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2008.00840.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Hayes, Tanya M., 2006. "Parks, People, and Forest Protection: An Institutional Assessment of the Effectiveness of Protected Areas," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 2064-2075, December.
    7. Scott E. Page, 2007. "Prologue to The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies, Princeton University Press.
    8. Gibson, Clark C. & Williams, John T. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2005. "Local Enforcement and Better Forests," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 273-284, February.
    9. Oyono, Phil Rene & Kouna, Charlotte & Mala, William, 2005. "Benefits of forests in Cameroon. Global structure, issues involving access and decision-making hiccoughs," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 357-368, March.
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