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The Danish Corporate Governance System: from stakeholder orientation towards shareholder value

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  • Caspar Rose
  • Carsten Mejer

Abstract

This article presents a description of the Danish corporate governance system. It is similar to other continental European corporate governance systems, having concentrated ownership and no well‐functioning market for corporate control. However, contrary to other European corporate governance systems, foundation ownership plays a vital and significant role in Denmark. Traditionally, the Danish corporate governance system has been oriented towards protecting the rights of various stakeholders and not only shareholders. In recent years, more pressure has been put on Danish firms for promoting shareholder value. As a consequence, Danish managers have begun to receive stock‐related incentive contracts, although the Danish institutional framework still facilitates the protection of a broader range of stakeholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Caspar Rose & Carsten Mejer, 2003. "The Danish Corporate Governance System: from stakeholder orientation towards shareholder value," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 335-344, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:11:y:2003:i:4:p:335-344
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8683.00331
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rose, Caspar, 2002. "Impact of Takeover Defenses on Managerial Incentives," Working Papers 2002-5, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
    2. Thomsen, Steen & Rose, Caspar, 2002. "Foundation ownership and financial performance. Do companies need owners?," Working Papers 2002-3, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
    3. Romano, Roberta, 1996. "Corporate Law and Corporate Governance," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 277-339.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kamini Gupta & Donal Crilly & Thomas Greckhamer, 2020. "Stakeholder engagement strategies, national institutions, and firm performance: A configurational perspective," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(10), pages 1869-1900, October.
    2. Teemu Malmi & David S. Bedford & Rolf Brühl & Johan Dergård & Sophie Hoozée & Otto Janschek & Jeanette Willert, 2022. "The use of management controls in different cultural regions: an empirical study of Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Nordic practices," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 273-334, September.
    3. Charles T. Crespy & Van V. Miller, 2011. "Sustainability reporting: A comparative study of NGOs and MNCs," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(5), pages 275-284, September.
    4. McSweeney, Brendan, 2009. "The roles of financial asset market failure denial and the economic crisis: Reflections on accounting and financial theories and practices," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(6-7), pages 835-848, August.

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