IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v7y1989i4p19-35.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Effect Of Firm Organizational Structure On Incentives To Engage In Price Fixing

Author

Listed:
  • JON M. JOYCE

Abstract

This article examines price fixing and bid rigging by applying the theory of the economics of crime to explain the calculus of the individual decision maker in the firm. This approach departs somewhat from the traditional approach to investigations of collusion. The latter has emphasized market structure and firm interrelationships while it has ignored the characteristics of the firm itself. But analyses ignoring firm organizational and financial structure are incomplete insomuch as these factors are crucial to the incentives and costs that the decision maker confronts. This paper offers an alternative approach in which price‐fixing and bid‐rigging offenders' prominent characteristics apparently are mirrored in defendant firms and individuals that the Antitrust Division has prosecuted recentlv.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon M. Joyce, 1989. "Effect Of Firm Organizational Structure On Incentives To Engage In Price Fixing," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 7(4), pages 19-35, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:7:y:1989:i:4:p:19-35
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00573.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00573.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00573.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fraas, Arthur G & Greer, Douglas F, 1977. "Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 21-44, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. John Thompson & David Kaserman, 2001. "After The Fall: Stock Price Movements and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(3), pages 329-334, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christopher S Decker & William Corcoran & David T Flynn, 2011. "Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes and the Lake Carriers Association," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 450-469.
    2. Ronald W. Cotterill, 1998. "Estimation of Cost Pass Through to Michigan Consumers in the ADM Price Fixing Case," Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports 039, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
    3. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.
    4. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.
    5. Ari Hyytinen & Frode Steen & Otto Toivanen, 2019. "An Anatomy of Cartel Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2155-2191.
    6. Pal, Rupayan & Scrimitore, Marcella, 2016. "Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 266-269.
    7. Dick, Andrew R, 1996. "When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 241-283, April.
    8. World Bank Group, 2016. "South Africa Economic Update, February 2016," World Bank Publications - Reports 23762, The World Bank Group.
    9. Connor, John M., 2002. "THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL GLOBAL CARTELS OF THE 1990s: OVERVIEW AND UPDATE," Staff Papers 28631, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    10. Darai, D. & Roux, C. & Schneider, F., 2019. "Mergers, Mavericks, and Tacit Collusion," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1984, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    11. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 47-64, February.
    12. David Barrus & Frank Scott, 2020. "Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 483-522, September.
    13. Symeonidis, George, 1999. "In Which Industries Is Collusion More Likely?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2301, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2013. "Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 524-544, November.
    15. Kühn, Kai-Uwe, 2006. "How Market Fragmentation Can Facilitate Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 5948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. John Thompson & David Kaserman, 2001. "After The Fall: Stock Price Movements and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(3), pages 329-334, November.
    17. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    18. Bernd-O. Heine & Matthias Meyer & Oliver Strangfeld, 2005. "Stylised Facts and the Contribution of Simulation to the Economic Analysis of Budgeting," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 8(4), pages 1-4.
    19. McCutcheon, Barbara, 1997. "Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 330-350, April.
    20. Frank Verboben, 1997. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:7:y:1989:i:4:p:19-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.