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Market collusion and the politics of protection

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  • Ludema, Rodney D.

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  • Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Market collusion and the politics of protection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 817-833, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:4:p:817-833
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    1. Martin Richardson, 2017. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Dimensions of Trade Policy, chapter 11, pages 221-242, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James, 2001. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 244-276, April.
    3. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 574-601, June.
    4. Fraas, Arthur G & Greer, Douglas F, 1977. "Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 21-44, September.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    6. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
    7. Rod Falvey, 1998. "Mergers in Open Economies," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(8), pages 1061-1076, November.
    8. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-1123, November.
    9. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-660, June.
    10. Lovely, Mary E & Nelson, Douglas R, 1994. "Illegal Trade and Endogenous Tariff Formation," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 182-194.
    11. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    12. Conlon, John R & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Primary and Secondary Reform," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 590-602, October.
    13. Feinberg, Robert M., 1989. "Imports as a threat to cartel stability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 281-288, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2012. "Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-201, June.
    2. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2012. "Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-201, June.
    3. Büthe, Tim & Morgan, Stephen, 2015. "Antitrust Enforcement and Foreign Competition: Special Interest Theory Reconsidered," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205607, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Astrid Jung & Tomaso Duso, 2004. "Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers vie0402, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    5. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2007. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 9-29, March.
    6. Annicchiarico, Barbara & Marvasi, Enrico, 2019. "Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    7. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2003. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers vie0315, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    8. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2007. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 9-29, March.

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