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Western Rangelands Reform: An Analysis Of The 1996 Senate Vote On Federal Grazing Fees

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  • Gerald A. Fennemore
  • Jon P. Nelson

Abstract

Grazing of livestock on public lands is a controversial environmental issue, despite a long history of federal regulation of this activity. Environmentalists and economists have argued that grazing fees charged by the Bureau of Land Management subsidize livestock operators and that higher fees would help bring rangeland usage in line with environmental and economic goals. In 1996, the U.S. Senate voted to determine whether higher fees would be charged for use of federally owned land. Based on a theoretical model, probit regressions are used to analyze this vote with respect to the influences of the general electorate, special interests, party affiliation, senatorial preferences, and electoral security. We find that political competition among producers utilizing federal lands was a crucial factor in determining voting decisions. However, environmental interests had a smaller direct impact on the grazing fee vote.

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  • Gerald A. Fennemore & Jon P. Nelson, 2001. "Western Rangelands Reform: An Analysis Of The 1996 Senate Vote On Federal Grazing Fees," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(3), pages 322-335, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:19:y:2001:i:3:p:322-335
    DOI: 10.1093/cep/19.3.322
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    1. Gardner, B. Delworth, 1997. "The Political Economy Of Public Land Use," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, July.
    2. Wittman, Donald, 1983. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 142-157, March.
    3. Hahn, Robert W, 1990. "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying Framework," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 21-47, April.
    4. David K. Lambert, 1995. "Grazing On Public Rangelands: An Evolving Problem Of Property Rights," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(2), pages 119-128, April.
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    1. Sun, Changyou, 2006. "A roll call analysis of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act and constituent interests in fire policy," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 126-138, November.

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